Executive Summary
A number of recent academic studies have compared U.S. private equity returns to U.S. public equity returns, generally concluding that average private equity returns have been no better than public equity returns. These results are surprising, given the risk premium typically expected of private equity investments.
Private equity tends to be illiquid, often with a high degree of valuation uncertainty, and tends to incur high costs of origination, research, due diligence, monitoring, and governance. While private equity management fees are in general notably higher than public equity fees, in the papers that I cite, in most cases the private equity returns are shown net of fees. All considered, one would expect (and this appears to be conventional wisdom) that private equity returns should substantially exceed public equity returns. The research I mention, however, suggests on average this risk premium is not evident. It is noteworthy that the top private equity managers have outperformed public markets by a wide margin -which may explain the often erroneous perception.
The question remains, however: given the illiquidity and additional costs in private equity, should not the average return on private equity have exceeded that of public markets? Given the premium that U.S. small-cap stocks have historically earned over U.S. large-cap stocks, plus the potential for manager value-added, I propose U.S. small cap equity as an alternative to private equity. Small-cap public equity typically involves less of the resource costs (time and staff) associated with private equity. The idea for comparing small caps to private equity was inspired by the first paper I reviewed.
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I also review manager value-added returns to address the argument that, while private equity returns have not outperformed public equity returns on average, the upper quartile private equity managers have. To determine quartile rankings for private equity managers, Thomson Reuters ("Thomson") evaluated performance for a large sample of private equity funds, including both venture and buyouts. Thomson shows private equity returns by quartile, after management and sales fees, and relate to the 1985 -2005 period. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. I show small-cap manager performance over a slightly different 20-year period and conclude the median manager has frequently outperformed the small-cap benchmarks. While the amount of value-added performance in small cap depends on style, it appears to compare reasonably well with the value added produced by upper quartile private equity managers. 4 My overall conclusion is that based on long-term performance, small cap has been a viable alternative to private equity in seeking compelling returns. This paper makes little mention of risk. While risk may be easily calculated in public equities, it is more problematic to quantify in private equity. This is because private equity investments generally, until recent accounting changes, were carried at cost until paid out or revalued. In the early part of the "J-curve" private equity investments tend to produce little cash flow and so appear to have zero beta (correlation to public markets) -no wonder they appear to be good diversifiers! Researchers have tried methodologies such as those applied in real estate (another infrequently valued asset class) with limited success. Thomson does not calculate or refer to the volatility of returns, although they do calculate the dispersion of manager returns about the median for a given vintage year. For these reasons, I do not discuss risk in this paper.
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I. Private Equity Returns: the Popular Perception
By way of background, private equity includes venture capital and buyouts. Venture capital includes seed, early stage, and later stage investments, and is generally perceived as the higher returning category of private equity. Buyouts include mezzanine investments.
Thomson Reuters is a leading provider of return data for venture capital, buyouts, and private equity. Their "2008 Investment Benchmark Returns" shows the returns provided in Exhibit 1, to which we have added returns of U.S. public markets for comparison.
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Thomson uses an internal rate of return ("IRR") calculation based on "takedowns" (actual capital calls, as opposed to committed capital), distributions (cash and/or securities), and residual value (investments carried at cost unless otherwise revalued). The IRR methodology is appropriate for private equity, since the investments are illiquid and not frequently priced -unlike public equity investments. In illiquid investments the Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") standard "time-weighted rate of return" is considered difficult to use, since values of residuals are not always available at the time of cash flow. The data clearly shows that for most periods, private equity returns have been better than public equity returns, as measured by the S&P 500 Index. Keep in mind, however, the S&P 500 Index is comprised solely of large-cap stocks, and that past performance is not a guarantee of future results.
II. Review of Recent Private Equity Research
After reviewing a number of academic studies, I identified five papers that address the fundamental question: have private equity returns been historically better than public equity returns? Contrary to the returns listed in Exhibit 1, the five studies I reviewed suggest private equity has not outperformed public equity. 1. Chen, Baierl, Kaplan (2002) "Venture Capital and its Role in Strategic Asset Allocation" 2. Kaplan, Schoar (2003) "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows" 3. Cochrane (2004) "The Risk and Return of Venture Capital" 4. Ljungqvist, Richardson (2003) "The Cash Flow, Return and Risk Characteristics of Private Equity" 5. Lerner, Schoar, and Wong (2005) "Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices? The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle"
The five studies referenced in this paper are summarized below.
1. Chen, Baierl and Kaplan ("CBK") calculated the returns of 148 matured venture capital funds on the Thomson database between 1960 -1999, and compared them to public market returns over that period (using the S&P 500 Index as a proxy for large cap and Center for Research in Security Prices ("CRSP") pricing data for all stocks in CRSP's small cap universe as a proxy for small cap.
7 CBK used only matured private equity funds to avoid the use of interim pricing, which consists of carrying unrealized gains/losses at cost. By accounting convention in the private equity industry, unrealized investments are carried at cost unless impaired or revalued by subsequent refinancing. By using only matured funds, CBK calculated cash-on-cash IRRs and eliminated the potential for optimistic pricing of funds. CBK's returns are shown in Exhibit 2. 7 Disclosure for CRSP small cap data is included at the end of this paper. 8 The Center for Research in Security Prices provides pricing data for all stocks in CRSP's small-cap universe.
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Source: Chen, Baierl, and Kaplan (2002) . Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.
2. Kaplan and Schoar ("KS") calculated returns of "largely liquidated" 9 venture capital and buyout funds on the Thomson database. KS then calculated what they call the public market equivalent ("PME"). This uses the total return from investing in the S&P 500 Index over the same period. A PME is a ratio of private equity return to public equity return for a specific period. A PME of greater than one means the private equity investment exceeded the public equity investment. Exhibit 3 shows KS's annual and average PMEs over their sample period, 1980 -1997. Average equal weighted PMEs for private equity, venture capital, and buyouts were each about .96 over the sample period, indicating generally one would have been slightly better off in public markets. Venture capital performance improved over the sample period, while buyout performance was fairly stable throughout the period. He noted that generally the most successful projects progressed to the initial public offering ("IPO") or acquisition stage. These projects formed the right hand tail of the probability distribution of all returns. He used data on outof-business projects, which formed a smaller left-hand tail of the distribution. These two samples provided evidence as to the shape of the total probability distribution for all projects in the sample. Cochrane concluded that the annualized return estimate of his sample (15%) was fairly similar to that of the S&P 500 Index (15.9%) over the January 1987 to June 2000 period (he also noted a similarity to the CBK conclusion). LR's measurement of performance may be more accurate than the previously described studies, as LR took into account exactly when the capital investments were made by the fund; in comparison, the Thomson database uses takedown dates.
Ljungqvist and Richardson
LR found:
▄ It took on average six years to invest 90% of the committed capital.
▄
The internal rate of return of the average fund did not turn positive until the eighth year (suggesting interim pricing is not very informative).
The proper discounting of cash flow is significant as LR's study found (unlike prior studies) the private equity returns of closed funds exceeded equivalent public equity returns by 5.7% over 1981 -1993. However, the stillopen funds from 1994 to 2001 had an average annual return of -34%; reflecting 1) the typically long time period required to turn positive and 2) the rapid growth in private equity fundraising (producing excess demand for private equity relative to supply, as noted in this paper in factors driving returns).
LR examined the factors driving the positive returns and found that the main factor behind excess return was the early timing of investments in private equity (in 1998 -2000 there was a tenfold annual increase in private equity fund raising -shown in Exhibit 4.) They concluded that "too much money chasing too few deals" is likely to be a factor in future returns. 1) Did they compare private equity returns by vintage year with public market returns? They didn't, but since all funds were raised in the 1990s, public market data is readily available to allow for comparative analysis.
2) How did the authors adjust for interim pricing? They used seasoned or reasonably mature funds, so the bulk of the market value was realized. This is a similar technique to KS -understandable, since Antoinette Schoar co-authored both KS and LSW. CBK used the matured-funds approach described earlier.
The LSW study is significant because it shares a unique insight on private equity investing -the large success rate in LP investing of endowments was far ahead of pension funds, advisors, and banks, except in the buyout category.
At the May 2007 CFA Institute Annual Conference, David Swensen, CIO of the Yale Foundation, spoke on successful private equity investing. Swensen said manager selection was "all that mattered" in private equity. Swensen was asked about his "secret recipe" -of which he spoke candidly. He said while equity weight and diversity will get you part of the way, the real trick is in the investment process and team and their ability to make high-quality asset decisions. He said that if you invest in absolute return assets (i.e., hedge funds, real estate and private equity) without skill, "You will get killed. Fees don't care who you are. The only way to be successful is to be top decile."
Overall, these five papers take diverse, rigorous, and objective approaches to answering a key question facing potential investors: have private equity returns exceeded public market returns? The five papers we reviewed raise some serious doubts that the answer is "yes." 
III. Review of Small-Cap Performance Large-Cap vs. Small-Cap Returns
Exhibit 6 shows returns and standard deviations of large-cap and small-cap U.S. public stocks from January 1926 through December 2008. The S&P 500 Index is used for large cap. Small cap data is based on Ibbotson's universe of small-cap stocks. The compound annualized return of small cap over this period was 16.5% vs. 12.9% for large cap.
Exhibit 6: Annualized Return and Standard Deviation: Small Cap vs. Large Cap, 1926 -2008
Small-cap stocks outperformed large caps by 3.6% annualized over this time frame, shown graphically in Exhibit 7. The scale is a log scale, so it shows percentage return differences between small cap and large cap fairly in all periods -otherwise the large dollar differences in later years swamp the early-year return differences. It may be noted that small cap underperformed large cap for a long period following the depression in 1929. From 1950 through 2008, small-cap stocks outperformed large-cap stocks.
Exhibit 7: Cumulative Returns, Small Cap vs. Large Cap, 1926 -2008*
Exhibit 8 shows the out-performance of small-cap stocks vs. large caps in 4-year rolling periods 11 -a time frame commonly used by institutional investors. Small cap out-performance has varied but persisted over the long term. $10,000 1 9 2 6 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 8 1 9 4 2 1 9 4 6 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 6 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 6 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 The argument is sometimes made that, while average private equity returns have not fared better than public markets, upper quartile private equity returns have been much better than public markets. The purpose of this section is to shed some light on the magnitude of potential value added from manager selection, and to demonstrate that significant value added is also attainable in small-cap public equities.
Asset
To determine quartile rankings for private equity managers, Thomson evaluated performance for a large sample of private equity funds, which included venture and buyouts. All returns are after management and sales fees, and we show for comparison purposes the 1987 -2007 period. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.
As the quartiles show, manager selection has been key in private equity performance (e.g., our earlier quote from David Swenson 1 9 2 6 1 9 6 5 1 9 5 9 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 3 1 9 4 4 1 9 3 8 1 9 3 2 1 9 7 1 1 9 8 0 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 4 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 6 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 1 9 2 9 1 9 6 8 1 9 6 2 1 9 5 6 1 9 4 7 1 9 4 1 1 9 3 5 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 4 "Horizon IRRs" are calculated using a pooling of cash flow during the period in question, and may include cash flow of funds formed prior to the period in question. This approach counts the net asset value (NAV) of those earlier funds as a takedown (outlay) occurring at the beginning of the period. NAV, which is interim pricing, may overestimate asset values.
"Vintage IRRs" are also calculated using a pooling of cash flow, but using only the cash flow of funds formed during the period. This pooling of cash flow results in a cap-weighted, time-dependent IRR (which, of its own, is neither right nor wrong). However, the effect of size weighting in the actual data increased the IRR, since larger funds have had higher IRRs than smaller funds. The effect of time dependence varies.
We discuss manager value added in public equities below.
Exhibit 10 shows the frequency of out-performance of the median portfolio return for each category compared to equity indices by size and style. The following data suggests that the median of small-cap managers, over time, have beaten their benchmarks fairly consistently, and more frequently than large-cap managers. Clearly, manager selection has produced value-added returns in both small-cap stocks and private equity. In addition, depending on the style, the magnitude of potential out-performance from small-cap managers, 13 as shown in Exhibit 11, appears to have compared reasonably well with the difference between median and first quartile private equity funds, as shown in Exhibit 9. 
V. Conclusion
Private equity investing tends to require extensive commitments in time and resources, is illiquid and has a high degree of valuation uncertainty. Logically, private equity should provide premium returns to compensate for these costs. However, according to a number of academic studies, average historical private equity returns -adjusted for interim pricing -appear to have been less than historical small-cap public equity returns.
Small-cap public equity, on the other hand, can offer a viable alternative to private equity. In addition to generally having provided better long-term historical returns than large cap, it also appears that active small-cap managers have, on average, produced respectable excess returns over a given benchmark. This further enhances the attractiveness of small-cap returns and mitigates the argument that (if you had the resources and could pick them and had access to them) only private equity managers have provided value-added relative performance. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.
The CRSP Cap-Based Portfolio data tracks micro, small, mid and large-cap stocks on monthly and quarterly frequencies. For the Cap-Based Portfolios, CRSP ranks all NYSE companies by market capitalization and then divides them into ten equally populated portfolios. AMEX and NASDAQ stocks are then placed into the deciles determined by the NYSE breakpoints, based on their market capitalization. The largest capitalizations in each decile serve as the breakpoints that are applied to various exchange groupings. CRSP portfolios 1-2 represent large cap stocks, portfolios 3-5 represent mid-caps, portfolios 6-8 represent small caps, and portfolios 9-10 represent benchmark micro-caps. The portfolio returns include the reinvestment of dividends and income, but do not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Ibbotson Associates data universe includes companies traded in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Companies in deciles 1-2 are defined as large, deciles 3-5 are midsize, deciles 6-8 are small, and deciles 9-10 are micro company stocks. Growth and value styles for each size grouping are determined by the book-to-price ratio where the total market capitalization of the growth and value indices are equal for that size portfolio. All Ibbotson growth and value indices were constructed with data from CRSP, the Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago. Index composition is rebalanced annually in June. The Ibbotson universe of small cap stocks measures performance of small cap stocks in Ibbotson Associates' data universe defined by Ibbotson as "small cap." It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Large Cap Core style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in large capitalization domestic equity using a strategy that is not characterized as growth or value. The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of large cap equity funds without focusing on a particular investment style. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Large Cap Value style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in large capitalization domestic equity using a value-oriented strategy. The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of large cap value equity funds. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Large Cap Growth style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in large capitalization domestic equity using a growth-oriented strategy. The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of large cap growth equity funds. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Large Cap All style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who invest in equities in all market capitalizations, regardless of style (growth, value or core). The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of all cap equity funds without focusing on a particular investment style. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Small Cap Core style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in small capitalization domestic equity using a strategy that is not characterized as growth or value. The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of small cap equity funds without focusing on a particular investment style. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Small Cap Value style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in small capitalization domestic equity using a value-oriented strategy. The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of small cap value equity funds. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Small Growth Value style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in small capitalization domestic equity using a growth-oriented strategy. The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of small cap growth equity funds. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
The Mercer Small Cap All style category is comprised of actively managed separate accounts from managers who concentrate their holdings in small capitalization domestic equity regardless of style (growth, value or core). The purpose of this group is to allow a comparison with the universe of small cap equity funds without focusing on a particular investment style. It includes the reinvestment of dividends and income, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
S&P 500 -SP500 G: The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged, market capitalization weighted index that measures the equity performance of 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy. Although the index focuses on the large cap segment of the market, with approximately 75% coverage of U.S. equities, it can also be a suitable proxy for the total market. This index includes dividends and distributions, but does not reflect fees, brokerage commissions, withholding taxes, or other expenses of investing.
